

# Information security

Strategic considerations  
in a national perspective



**„Internet is just a hype...“**

- Ines Uusman Swedish Minister of communication (12 May 1996)

## Agenda

### □ **Part 1 Case study**

- Ericsson 2003
- Estonia 2007
- Carema 2011
- Tieto 2011
- Swedish Government 2012

### □ **Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security**

- Value perspective
- Responsibility
- Forum
- Building competence and knowledge
- Indicators

### □ **Part 3 Swedish information security strategy**

- History
- National strategy for information security
- National forum SAMFI
- CERT.se
- National plan for the management of severe IT incidents
- SGSI

# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Ericsson 2003

- General description
  - System intrusion in the purpose of stealing vital information and to affect on system integrity
- Attack vectors
  - Exploring general system vulnerabilities
  - System intrusion leading to authorized access
  - Collecting information on site
  - Encrypted information transfer session
- Aim
  - Selling information
  - Selling consultation services
- Consequences
  - Modified the platform of T 68
  - Gathered classified information:
    - JAS 39 Gripen
    - Erieye

## Estonia 2007

- General description
  - Cyberattacks on Estonia refers to a series of cyber attacks that began April 27, 2007 and swamped websites of Estonian organizations, including Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters,
- Attack vectors
  - Most of the attacks that had any influence on the general public were DoS or DDoS type attacks ranging from single individuals using various methods like ping floods to expensive rentals of botnets usually used for spam distribution. Spamming of bigger news portals commentaries and defacements including that of the Estonian reform party website also occurred
- Aim
  - Show of force by inflict on the possibility to run the national administration
- Consequences
  - Disruption in bank system, health care news flow and general society
  - administration

## Carema 2011

- General description
  - The websites of the Swedish private run health company CAREMA was chosen as target for the hacker community “Anonymoumys”.
- Attack vectors
  - DDoS
- Aim
  - Public statement
- Consequences
  - All services connected with the website was disrupted and the company suffered severe business losses

## Tieto 2011

- General description
  - Friday the 25<sup>th</sup> of November 2011 Tieto, a major hosting and supervision IT-company, was hit by a vital and fatal error in the data store system and the reserve system minutes later. 50 major costumers was involved Including municipality administration governmental administration, pharmacies, banks, universities, Stockholm city administration. The company have classified all details
- Attack vectors
  - Not released
- Aim
  - Not clarified/released
- Consequences
  - brought major assets of society administration down for two days. All customers working with tools connected to the web was out of business

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**AnonOpsSweden** Anonymous Sweden av cyber\_force

Target: regeringen.se Up again, going down again?

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**cyber\_force** CyberForce

Låt kanoner vara på! Supporta de människor som står och protesterar i kylan! [#AntiSec](#) [#ACTA](#)

4 feb

Ge



**cyber\_force** CyberForce

Ser alldeles underbart ut! [#ACTA](#) [#SOPA](#) [#PIPA](#)  
[pic.twitter.com/ZGjdn1Th](http://pic.twitter.com/ZGjdn1Th)

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**cyberhoran** Cyberhoran av cyber\_force

[@AnonOpsSweden](#) [dajmandedoris.blogg.se](http://dajmandedoris.blogg.se)  
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[analslickandeanna.blogg.se](http://analslickandeanna.blogg.se)

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**cyber\_force** CyberForce

[@AnonOpsSweden](#) [pastebin.com/G4tPySy1](http://pastebin.com/G4tPySy1) target:regeringen.se  
[#ACTA](#) [#SOPA](#) [#PIPA](#)

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**cyber\_force** CyberForce



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# BRINGING CIVILIZATION TO ITS KNEES...



# Three types of aggressors and how to respond

- The dumb
  - 1.Doesn't care who he affects
  - 2.Spamming
  - 3.Virus (known profiles)
  - 4.Chain letters
  - 5.Fraud
- The evil
  - 1.Wants you
  - 2.Specific idea
  - 3.Generally skilled
  - 4.Network in hand
  - 5.DoS
  - 6.Intrusion
  - 7.Worms and Trojans
- The rich
  - 1.Unlimited resources
  - 2.Contacts with providers of IT
  - 3.States or extremely well established hacker-networks
  - 4.All vectors
- Low profile business and non vital low level society administration
  - 1.Standard security setups
  - 2.Documented routines for security management
- Important level of society administration and high profile business
  - 1.Thorough understanding of own core business vital assets
  - 2.Top management commitment to security
  - 3.High level of security awareness
  - 4.Security management of high quality
  - 5.Referring to international standards
- Administration of great national importance and extremely vital business
  - 1.Vital aspects analyzed to the point
  - 2.Tailored solutions
  - 3.Robust communication
  - 4.Security trained personnel
  - 5.External systems
  - 6.Vetting
  - 7.Inhouse



## Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security

- How do we think wisely in relation to these examples of attacks
  - 1. Since there are:
    - a lot of modus operandi
    - a lot of different type of actors/aggressors
    - a huge amount of information to protect
  - 2. Since we can't handle life without our systems

# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security

- Value perspective
  - Analyze your business, what is core business most important
  - components and what is the value of that.
  - (What if... and what if not...)



## Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security

- Responsibility
  - Divide responsibility
  - Put names on the lists, not functions
  - Follow up

## Part 2 Four action rules for successive information security

- Forum
  - Common problems common solutions
  - Where do we take decisions
  - Where do we divide responsibilities
  - Where do we speak the truth!

## Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security


- Indicators
  - Hard to tell when and where
  - Hard to tell how and why
  - But there are better and worse trends



## Part 2 Five action rules for successive information security

- Building knowledge and competence
  - In order to educate
  - Certify
  - Develop action plans
  - Develop rules and regulations





Water is essential in every society that's why all types of threats against our water should be embraced by our authorities including those on the cyber arena

# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Part 3 Swedish national information security achievements

- ❑ History
- ❑ National strategy for information security
- ❑ National forum SAMFI
- ❑ CERT.se
- ❑ National plan for the management of severe IT incidents
- ❑ SGSI



KONKURRENSNEUTRAL IT-SÄKERHET FÖR  
NÄRINGSLIV OCH OFFENTLIG SEKTOR



Swedish Civil  
Contingencies  
Agency



SWEDISH ARMED FORCES




## Part 3 History


- 1980-1995 We are all beginners at some point
- 1995-2000 Understanding the need
- 2000-2008 Learning and arguing
- 2008-2012 Down to business

# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Part 3 National strategy for information security




## Part 3 National plan for the management of severe IT incidents



# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Part 3 CERT.se



## Part 3 National forum SAMFI

The following agencies cooperate in SAMFI:

- Authority Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
- Post and Telecom Agency (PTS)
- National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)
- Security Police (SAPO) and National Criminal Investigation Department
- Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) (CSEC)
- Armed Forces (FM) / Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST)

# Strategic considerations in a national perspective

## Part 3 SGSII

Secure communication between agencies  
Secure communication with EU (TESTA)  
Connects more than 20 agencies  
Separated from open internet  
Encrypted





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